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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the risk-return relationship by using an ordinal strategic risk measure of 
risk rather than the more conventional variance-based measures. A set of hypotheses is specified 
linking ordinal strategic risk, return, and organizational slack. Empirical results are interesting in 
that they allow elaborating the idea that strategic risk may have a positive effect on subsequent 
performance and that performance has a negative effect on subsequent risk. Such a self-correcting 
cycle offers an interesting contrast to the “vicious circle” proposed by previous risk-return 
research based on prospect theory. Overall, this paper suggests that new conceptual and 
methodological risk approaches are needed to better understand the risk taking process in 
organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
owman‟s seminal work (1980, 1982) pointed out the theoretical and empirical contradictions between 
corporate risk-return relations and the positive risk-return relations derived from modern financial 
portfolio theory. The so-called Bowman's paradox has stimulated a rich stream of research and 
continues to fascinate strategy scholars (e.g., Andersen, Denrell and Bettis, 2007; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 2004; 
Miller and Chen, 2003, 2004; Wang, Barney, and Reuer, 2003). 
 
According to Bowman, behavioral theory provides a possible explanation for the paradoxical patterns 
observed in corporate risk-return studies. Sparked by Bowman‟s intuition, other researchers sought to empirically 
test hypotheses derived from behavioral explanations of managerial risk avoidance and risk seeking
1
. As indicated 
by Andersen, Denrell and Bettis (2007: 408), there are three widely accepted explanations for Bowman's risk-return 
paradox: (1) contingencies that influence the risk behavior of organizational decision-makers; (2) outcomes from 
strategic conduct; and (3) statistical artifacts. Here we pursue the view that higher risk seems to cause higher 
performance, thus leading to virtuous performance cycle over time. Our results are in line with the strategic conduct 
perspective as they suggest that inverse risk-return relationships could be the result of good management practices. 
 
The primary objective of this study is to model the impact of past performance on risk taking and the 
impact of risk taking on subsequent performance. We draw from the process theory of organizational decision 
making (Cyert and March, 1963) to develop testable hypotheses regarding relations between risk and firm 
performance. These relations become explicit in a two-equation model of relations between risk and return allowing 
for moderating effects associated with organizational slack.  
 
To our best knowledge, empirical studies examining risk-return models by using conceptualizations and 
risk measures different from a variance-based approach, are quite rare. We use here the ordinal strategic risk 
                                                 
1 For comprehensive reviews of the literature we refer the interested reader to Bromiley, Miller, and Rau (2001) and Nickel and 
Rodriguez (2002). 
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measure originally developed by Collins and Ruefli (1992). Within their framework, risk is defined in terms of the 
probability of losing rank position vis a vis the other firms in a reference set.  
 
In line with the research stream initiated by Singh (1986), and then developed by Bromiley (1991) and 
Miller and Leiblein (1996), we provide an alternative approach to analyze risk-return relationships. This study seeks 
to further this line of research, testing for possible ties between risk taking and future economic performance. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Cyert and March (1963) viewed firms as large systems of standard operating procedures or routines. 
Managers in firms have both levels of performance they aspire to and levels of performance they except. According 
to Cyert and March, when performance falls below the level of aspirations, firms respond by initiating searches for 
alternative routines. Such managerial attention to performance that falls short of a target level is consistent with 
“chance of loss” conceptualization of risk underlying ordinal strategic risk. Deficiencies in performance relative to 
aspirations stimulate searches designed to generate alternatives that will resolve performance crisis. The behavioral 
theory of the firm suggests that search continues in a sequential fashion until the organization encounters an 
alternative with an expected performance exceeding the aspiration level. It is assumed that that the profit generated 
by this solution more than offsets the short-term cost associated with search. The behavioral theory of the firm 
suggests a failure to reach aspired-to performance levels will result in new routines that lead to improved subsequent 
performance. 
 
A first hypothesis tests the effect of ordinal strategic risk on organizational performance. The more 
interesting issue is whether or not ordinal strategic risk results in a relative improvement in a firm‟s own 
performance. The authors of much of the literature on innovation, organizational change, and general management 
have assumed that change and risk taking have a positive influence on future performance (e.g. Aaker and Jacobson, 
1987). In general, economic analyses have argued that firms need to be compensated for taking risks with high 
returns. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Ordinal strategic risk has a positive influence on future financial performance. 
 
The behavioral argument underlying Hypothesis 1 rests on the assumption that ordinal strategic risk 
focuses manager‟s attention on problem solving and that ensuing search results in the identification and 
implementation of a performance-enhancing alternative strategy. As Cyert and March (1963: 278) stated, “We have 
argued that failure induces search and search generally results in solutions.” A plausible alternative to Hypothesis 1 
is that firms are dominated by inertia and fail to respond to ordinal strategic risk with performance-enhancing 
changes. The view that inertia, rather than managerial strategic choice, characterizes firms is most strongly asserted 
in population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The absence of empirical support for the hypothesized positive 
relation between ordinal strategic risk and future performance would be consistent with the inertia hypothesis. It 
should be noted that changes in strategy mediate the relation between ordinal strategic risk and future financial 
performance and, hence, the hypothesized relation between these two constructs is not directly causal. 
 
The direct impact of performance on risk taking is central to work by Bowman (1980, 1982) and by 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986, 1988) and was significant in Bromiley‟s (1991) research. Behavioral theorists 
motivated by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) have contended that poor performers are more likely 
than high performers to engage in risky strategies. Prospect theory suggests that poorly performing firms may take 
greater risks than strongly performing firms. Such risky strategies may have low expected values, but the firms 
expect eventually that some strategic gamble will improve firm performance. Strong performers, on the other hand, 
will reduce their risk-taking strategic initiatives.  
 
In an examination of players‟ responses to a strategic marketing game, Lant and Montgomery (1987) found 
that performance below aspirations resulted in riskier choices (risk was formulated as variance or uncertainty) and 
more innovative search than performance that met or exceeded aspirations. Fisher and hall (1969) presented an 
economic argument for the impact of performance on risk taking. They concluded that, “earnings should be larger, 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fourth Quarter 2008  Volume 24, Number 4 
 53 
on the average, for firms with greater variations in their earnings than for firms with little earnings variability” 
(1969: 82). Overall, these arguments support the contention that strong financial performance decreases ordinal 
strategic risk and that poor performance increases it. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Financial performance has a negative influence on future ordinal strategic risk. 
 
The behavioral theory of the firm introduces organizational slack as a moderator of organizational 
response. Slack defines excess resources that a firm can use to loosen the ties between environmental changes and 
the need for organizational responses. Organizational slack resources accumulate during periods of performance 
above aspirations and diminish during periods of unsatisfactory performance. Slack determines a firm‟s motivation 
to seek out revenue-enhancing changes in operating routines and strategies in response to performance shortfalls. 
High-slack firms are less likely to undertake searches for new strategies when faced with ordinal strategic. Ordinal 
strategic risk has thus a less positive impact on future financial performance for high-slack firms than for low-slack 
firms.  
 
The direct influence of slack on future performance is unclear (Cyert and March, 1963: 279). Slack may be 
seen as wasted resources, so that firms with high levels of slack should result in low performance. But such a slack-
performance association is static. It says nothing about the influence of slack on future financial performance when 
current performance is controlled. Slack also allows firms the ability “to take advantage of opportunities afforded by 
the environment” (Thompson, 1967: 150). Firms with additional resources have more strategic options available 
than firms without resources. Alternatively, a lack of slack may force a firm to manage very carefully. Firms with 
levels of slack substantially below the normal for their industry may be expected to find ways to reduce costs and 
improve performance. Firms with much slack obtain a competitive advantage and firms with little slack must 
manage carefully. Either action should increase performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Slack increases future financial performance. 
 
The influence of slack on risk taking depends on the relation of slack to a target level of slack (March and 
Shapira, 1987). If slack falls substantially below its target level, managers take risks in order to create additional 
slack (Cyert and March, 1963; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). Alternatively, if slack is around the target level, 
managers take few risks. They see their firm as operating in a satisfactory manner and continue with conventional 
routines (Cyert and March, 1963). 
 
Regarding the direct effect of slack on ordinal strategic risk, the presence of slack resources is expected to 
allow firms to undertake investments reducing subsequent ordinal strategic risk. Firms with slack resources 
formulate responses to a greater range of environmental contingencies than do resource-constrained firms (Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972). In so doing, high-slack firms reduce their ordinal strategic risk relative to low-slack firms. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Slack reduces future ordinal strategic risk. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Model Specification 
 
The model consists of two equations. The primary relations are those between risk and future performance 
and the effect of performance on future risk. The time period subscripts indicate the time lags incorporated in the 
model. The hypotheses under each regression equation summarize the expected relations developed in the previous 
section. Previous return in equation [A] below controls for firm-specific historical effects. Similarly, equation [B] 
includes past risk to control for firm-specific historical influences on risk. The two equations are as follows: 
 
Returnt = α0 + α1 riskt-1 + α2 slackt-1 + α3 returnt-1 + α4 industry returnt + εt. [A] 
For Hypothesis 1, α1  0; for Hypothesis 3, α2  0. 
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Riskt = β0 + β1 returnt-1 + β2 slackt-1 + β3 riskt-1 + β4 industry riskt + εt. [B] 
For Hypothesis 2, β1  0; for Hypothesis 4, β2  0. 
 
Controls. The lagged dependent variable and contemporaneous industry effects are included in the model as controls 
for other variables that have an impact on risk and return but are not explicitly considered in the behavioral theory of 
the firm. The risk and return variables are expected to be positively related with the same variables in the subsequent 
period (α3  0, β3  0). The lagged dependent variables express the ordinal strategic risk-return relations in the 
context of a firm‟s prior risk and return. 
 
The contemporaneous industry effect controls for difference in performance and risk across industry 
categories. Previous research has indicated the importance of industry controls in modeling risk-return relations (e.g. 
Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1986). Contemporaneous measures of risk and return serve as proxies for 
the attractiveness of an industry‟s structure. The industry return (risk) term in the return (risk) equation includes 
contemporaneous performance (risk) by all other firms in the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
industry
2
. If industry structure affects performance, average returns by other firms in the industry should be 
positively related to returns for any particular firm (α4  0). A general decline in industry performance would raise 
industry ordinal strategic risk. Ordinal strategic risk is expected to be positively related to ordinal strategic risk for a 
particular firm in the industry (β4  0). 
 
Lag structure. Although it has been widely argued that risk affects return and vice and versa, one of the difficulties 
in specifying a model of risk-return relations is inadequate understanding of the timing of these effects. Most 
previous studies in the strategy field made causal arguments relating risk and return but model risk and return as 
having contemporaneous effects on each other. An alternative to estimating contemporaneous risk-return relations is 
to specify a lagged model in which risk affects future return and vice versa. As Miller and Leiblein (1996) pointed 
out, given the unique characteristics of firms, it would be difficult to make any generalization regarding the 
appropriateness lag structure for risk-return relations. 
 
Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Miller and Leiblein (1996) found significant relations using a model in 
which risk in one five-year period explained return in the subsequent period. Bromiley (1991) modeled risk in one 
year as affecting return in the following year and vice versa. Although other lag structures may be reasonable, this 
study uses five-year periods to specify the lags in modeling risk-return relations. The slack, industry risk, and 
industry return variables were also computed over a five-year period. 
 
Measures And Sample 
 
Return. Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are two common accounting-based measures of 
performance. Both measures are highly correlated. Furthermore, both have been used to compute highly correlated 
accounting-based risk measures in previous strategy research (Miller and Bromiley, 1990). This study uses average 
ROA over the five-year period as the return measure. 
 
Strategic Risk. Risk in this study is based on the ordinal approach developed by Collins and Ruefli (1992). As a 
starting point, an intuitive feel for the ordinal context can be obtained by thinking of a set of firms that are ranked 
against each other annually for a period of time on the basis of a dimension selected as being appropriate to the 
research. We used annual ROA as the criteria for ranking firms‟ performance. In this context, favorable events are 
those that yield an improvement in rank, while unfortunate events are those that result in a loss of rank. An event of 
performance within an ordinal system is defined by four parameters: the firm (I), which is an entity of the system, its 
row of initial classification (J), its row of final classification (K), and the time (T) of event completion. All of which 
can be represented in a matrix of events,  = [I,J,K,T]. This matrix  is simply a set of all possible events or 
transitions which might occur in the system under observation.  
 
                                                 
2 A firm‟s own return (risk) is not included in the industry return (risk) for that observation. 
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We compute firms‟ ordinal strategic risk relative to a benchmark corresponding to the target level of risk 
for a firm. This benchmark is defined as the ordinal strategic risk for the reference set of firmsThe French CAC 40 
stock market indexused in this study. A detailed presentation of this method is out of the scope of this research. For 
the interested reader, Appendix contains the computational procedure used to generate an ordinal measure of a 
firm‟s strategic risk.  
 
Organizational slack. There is theoretical support for the relevance of reference levels in specifying slack. 
Bourgeois (1981) contended that changes in the amount of organizational slack over time, rather than absolute levels 
of slack, are relevant to explaining firm behavior. Similarly, Bromiley (1991) and March and Shapira (1987) argued 
the influence of slack on performance and risk depends not on the absolute level of slack but on slack relative to a 
target level. 
 
Financial ratios such as those commonly used as slack indicators differ across industries. Ratios that are the 
norm in one industry may be exceptionally high or low in another. Slack measures may not generalize across 
industries. According to Lev (1969), average industry financial ratios offer reasonable proxies for target levels. In 
this study, we measured slack as the ratio of a firm‟s own accounting measure to its industry average (at the two-
digit SIC level). Following Bourgeois (1981), we measured recoverable slack using the following ratios: (i) accounts 
receivable/sales, inventory/sales, and selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales. In each case, we computed 
normalized measures consisting of a firm‟s ratio divided by the two-digit SIC industry average ratio. 
 
Bourgeois and Singh (1983) also identified measures of both available and potential slack. Following Miler 
and Leiblein (1996), we chose to focus on recoverable slack because it is the most relevant concept of slack for 
many organizational stakeholders. Because of the immediate impact of recoverable slack on operations, constraints 
on recoverable slack are likely to be more salient to managers than constraints on potential or available slack. 
 
The aggregate recoverable slack measures for a given year consisted of an unweighted sum of the three 
standardized recoverable slack indicators. The slack measure used for model estimation was a firm‟s mean 
recoverable slack calculated over a five-year period. 
 
Sample. The sample consisted of all firms belonging to the French CAC 40 stock market index for which the 
necessary accounting data were available in the OSIRIS database during the years 1988 through 2002. We defined 
three periods corresponding to the five-year time segments of 1988-92, 1993-97, and 1998-02. Firms with returns or 
any organizational slack indicator beyond three standard deviations from the annual mean across all firms were 
considered outliers and eliminated from that year‟s data set. The final sample includes thirty eight firms out of a 
total of forty belonging to the French CAC 40. 
 
The choice of the French CAC 40 as the reference set of firms or system may limit the generality of the 
findings. Whilst there are a little bit more of thousand firms quoted on the French stock market, the CAC 40 index is 
a very meaningful indicator of the overall financial and economic wealth of the country. As for the American S&P 
500 index, firms included in the CAC 40 are among the strongest stock market capitalizations of the French 
financial market. Ordinal strategic risk-return relations observed from a CAC 40 sample may be interesting in their 
own right and also suggest a number of additional studies in different environments. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations between return, ordinal strategic risk, 
organizational slack, and the control variables for each of the three periods. Industry return and industry ordinal 
strategic risk denote the average ROA and ordinal strategic risk for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry 
(excluding the firm under observation). These two industry average variables serve as controls in the regression 
models. Table 1 indicates significant negative correlations between ordinal strategic risk and return. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and Correlations by Period 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 
Period 1: 1988-92       
1. Return 5.853 3.751     
2. Ordinal strategic risk - 0.003 0.114 -.576**    
3. Industry return 6.706 3.133 .501** -.407*   
4. Industry ord. strategic risk 0.903 0.780 -.535** .526** -.652***  
5. Organizational slack 0.227 0.116 -.242 -.121 .194 .222 
       
Period 2 : 1993-97       
1. Return 4.839 3.571     
2. Ordinal strategic risk - 0.007 0.088 -.771***    
3. Industry return 6.777 3.316 .513** -.111   
4. Industry ord. strategic risk 0.442 0.297 -.114 .417* -.768***  
5. Organizational slack 0.189 0.108 -.217 .419* .192 .397* 
       
Period 3 : 1998-02       
1. Return 5.739 3.912     
2. Ordinal strategic risk - 0.001 0.092 -.457**    
3. Industry return 5.116 2.886 .562** -.161   
4. Industry ord. strategic risk 0.129 0.901 -.124 .455** -.644***  
5. Organizational slack 0.165 0.083 -.393* .163 -.349 .348 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
Initial regression results for equations [1] and [2] indicated outlier observations may have unduly 
influenced the estimated coefficients. Outliers were eliminated if their influence statistics, DFFITS, indicated very 
influential observations
3
. Elimination of outliers resulted in deletion of two observations in the original sample 
observations. A comparison of the regression results before and after elimination of outliers indicated no substantive 
differences in the signs or magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present ordinary-least-squares results after elimination of the two outliers) for the return and 
risk regression equations, respectively. The column headings indicate the period of the dependent variable. For each 
period, the estimated standardized coefficients are displayed. When independent variables included in a linear 
regression model are correlated (as shown in Table 1), it may be very uneasy to isolate the individual influence of 
each one on the dependent variable. The standardized coefficients allow a better estimation of the respective 
influence of the independent variables on the dependent one. Basically, standardized coefficients are those obtained, 
if, prior to regression estimation, the independent variables were standardized (Z-score). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Regression analyses were carried out using the SPSS data analysis software. The DFFITS statistic is a scaled measure of the 
change in the predicted value for a given observation with and without including the observation in the model estimation. Large 
DFFITS values indicate very influential observations. Observations are thought to unduly affect model estimations when their 
DFFITS value exceeds np /2 , where p is the number of parameters in the model and n is the number of observations (Belsey, 
Kuhn, & Welsch, 1980). 
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Table 2 
Results of Regression Analyses for Return 
 1993-97  1998-02 
Variables Standardized 
Coefficients 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
Returnt, as a function of ordinal strategic riskt-1    
Intercept .731  .202* 
Ordinal strategic riskt-1         .361
**  .24** 
Organizational slackt-1    .261
*         .234** 
Returnt-1         .423
**  .689*** 
Industry returnt .272
*  .177* 
    
Adjusted R2  .656  .813 
F-ratio   13.378***    30.438*** 
N 36   36 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 3 
Results of Regression Analyses for Risk 
 1993-97  1998-02 
Variables Standardized 
Coefficients 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
Ordinal strategic riskt, as a function of returnt-1    
Intercept  .014   .046 
Returnt-1        -.489
**  -.453** 
Organizational slackt-1  .223   .200 
Ordinal strategic riskt-1  .377
*   .546*** 
Industry ordinal strategic riskt  .269   .120 
    
Adjusted R2   .477   .513 
F-ratio   6.921***    8.114*** 
N 36  36 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
The significant correlations among the independent variables evident in Table 1 motivated assessment of 
potential collinearity problems. Examinations of both the variance inflation factors and conditioning index statistics 
provided diagnostics well below the suggested guidelines, indicating collinearity did not present serious problem for 
model estimation.
4
.  
 
Hypothesis 1 states that ordinal strategic risk should have a positive relation with subsequent financial 
performance. The signs of the coefficients associated with ordinal strategic risk for the two five-year periods (Table 
2) are positive, supporting hypothesis 1. A firm that takes strategic risk tends to improve its performance in the 
following period. This result agrees with the results of Miller and Leiblein‟s (1996) and contradicts the negative 
risk-return relations supported by some previous research using variability measures of risk. Specifically, strategic 
risk is rewarded with higher future performance. 
                                                 
4 One approach for assessing collinearity is the calculation of variance inflation factors (VIFs). A VIF greater than 10 is often 
interpreted as an indication of collinearity problems (Neter, Wasseman, & Kutner, 1985). Conditioning indexes provide a 
supplemental collinearity diagnostic. Belsey et al. (1980) suggested that conditioning indexes in the neighborhood of 15 to 20 
tend to result from an underlying near dependencies among explanatory variables and that indexes in excess of 100 cause 
substantial variance inflation and potential large distortions in regression coefficients. For the four regressions presented in 
Tables 2 and 3, the maximum VIF was 1.06. The maximum conditioning index was 7.27. 
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Hypothesis 3 states that organizational slack should have a negative relation with subsequent financial 
performance. The significant positive coefficients associated with the slack variable in Table 2 support this 
hypothesis. Slack facilitates organizational responses to strategic risk, enhancing subsequent performance. Low-
slack firms may be constrained in their ability to implement successful searches for new organizational strategies. 
The control variables, lagged return and contemporaneous industry return, have the expected significant positive 
relations with return. 
 
The results shown in Table 3 shed light on Hypothesis 2 and 4. Hypothesis 2 states that financial 
performance should have a negative relation with subsequent ordinal strategic risk. As the behavioral theory of the 
firm suggests, firms performing well avoid the cost and uncertainty associated with searching for alternative 
strategies. The strategic risk model provides strong support for this hypothesis in all two periods (Table 3). 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that organizational slack would be negatively related with subsequent strategic risk. 
Slack would act as a buffer allowing firms to reduce subsequent strategic risk. The insignificant coefficients shown 
in Table 3 do not support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the slack effect has not the expected negative sign. Slack 
resources do not allow firms to reduce their subsequent strategic risk. One potential explanation is that the relation 
between slack and ordinal strategic risk is nonlinear, with both high and low levels of slack associated with high 
levels of risk and moderate levels of slack associated with high levels of risk.  Slack levels well above or below a 
firm‟s reference level should increase risk taking, and slack levels near the reference level should reduce it. The 
ordinal strategic model, as specified in equation [2], does not allow testing for this proposition. 
 
Contemporaneous industry ordinal strategic risk has the expected positive sign but it is not significant at the 
.05 level in the two periods studied (Table 3). Although the contemporaneous industry risk effect is not significant, 
which is counterintuitive, these results support inclusion of both controls. Some previous studies have found 
significant positive effects of contemporaneous industry risk (e.g. Miller and Leiblein, 1996) but they were not 
significant across periods. 
 
The positive relation of risk and subsequent return, using the ordinal strategic risk measure and the negative 
influence of return on risk are consistent and significant across the two periods. These results agree with the results 
of Miller and Leiblein‟s (1996). This pattern suggest an interesting sequence in agreement with the behavioral 
theory of the firm: taking strategic risk results in higher performance, but higher performance leads to less strategic 
risk taking. Using ordinal strategic risk, we have a self-correcting cycle that contrasts with the “vicious circle” 
hypothesized in previous research on Bowman„s (1980) risk-return paradox. Research applying prospect theory has 
contended that poorly performing firms take “bad risks” and that worse performance results (Bowman, 1982; 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991). Using ordinal strategic risk, we did not find evidence of such a 
downward spiral. On the contrary, we found that poor performers often take what Miller and Leiblein (1996: 114) 
defined as “good risks”. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The most common approach in strategic management studies has been to employ the variance of a set of 
returns over time as a risk measure. Using rigorous statistical grounds, Ruefli (1990) contended that variance-mean 
relations were not meaningful. As noted by Lehner (2000: 67), mean-variance analysis is useful only under certain 
conditionsfor example, when returns are normally distributed. Some recent studies have demonstrated that 
skewness of return distributions and serial dependence of performance can lead to spurious negative relationships 
between risk and return (Henkel, 2003; Denrell, 2004). Managerial surveys (e.g. Baird and Thomas, 1990; March 
and Shapira, 1987) suggest that downside concepts of risk, those specified in terms of failure to perform at a target-
to level, are much more relevant to practicing managers than performance variability, which includes both upside 
and downside outcomes. This debate regarding the appropriateness of variance measures is critical to evaluating the 
findings of prior strategy research incorporating variance measures of risk, such as research on corporate risk-return 
relations. In recognition of both the controversy regarding the conceptual validity of variance risk measures and the 
problem of unclear causality between risk and return, we have specified and tested a dynamic model of corporate 
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risk taking in which risk is based upon the chance of loss of relative position within a set of firms rather than 
outcome variance.  
 
As Miller and Leiblein‟s, our results challenge a major contention of previous research based on prospect 
theory, namely, the idea that poor performers take on risky strategies (high variance) with low expected values. Such 
risk-seeking behavior can be shown to increase the probability of firm survival despite reducing expected returns 
(Singh, 1986). Using a fundamentally different concept of risk ordinal strategic risk results in a very different 
pattern of risk-return relations. The evidence from this study indicates strategic risk leads to organizational strategic 
changes that improve, rather than reduce, subsequent firm performance. Our results indicate that this relation is 
strengthened by the presence of slack resources. Combining the results from the return and strategic risk equations 
indicates a self-correcting, rather than downward spiraling, cycle involving performance and strategic risk.  
 
The regression results also shed light on the role of slack resources in determining firm performance and 
strategic risk. The empirical evidence indicates that slack does not appear to play a role in determining firm risk 
taking. This result contradicts the contention that slack acts as a buffer reducing firm performance and risk-taking. 
These observations should motivate broader interest in ordinal strategic risk among strategy researchers. The initial 
results from this study encourage wider empirical treatments of ordinal strategic risk. 
 
As noted by Miller and Bromiley (1996), the behavioral theory, as a theory of organizational risk-return 
relations, suffers from two important shortcomings. First, since behavioral theory seeks to explain risk as a 
managerial choice, it neglects unchosen risks. Such a perspective acknowledges that managers and environments 
jointly determine risk-return relations. Second, strategic actions mediate the relations between strategic risk and 
performance from one period to the next. Good managers are risk seekers and support innovative behaviors that 
encourage the firm's capacity to adapt to environmental change (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 2004; Miller and Chen, 
2003). The behavioral theory, however, does not illuminate the content of these strategic actions. Explicit attention 
to the mediating strategic responses is thus essential to advancing research on strategic risk.  
 
These two observations suggest the ordinal strategic risk measure has applications beyond the parsimonious 
model tested here. Although research on risk-return relations has revealed the measurement properties of alternative 
risk measures (e.g. Bromiley, 1991; Miller and Bromiley, 1990; Ruefli, 1990; Ruefli et al., 1999; Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1991), it has done little to inform managerial decisions. The relations between firm strategy, industry 
structure, risk, and performance found in previous research (e.g. Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990; Oviatt and 
Bauerschmidt, 1991) could be reanalyzed from an ordinal strategic risk perspective. 
 
This study focused on the managerial perspective and emphasized a firm-specific ordinal strategic risk 
measure incorporating accounting returns, but shareholders may be more interested in the downside stock returns 
variability of a diversified portfolio. We might postulate that steps taken to address agency problems, such as 
changes in governance structures, monitoring, and management compensation systems, can result in managerial 
attention to maximizing shareholder returns rather than minimizing strategic risk. As suggested by Miller and Chen 
(2004: 113), managers can err either by excessive risk taking (type error I) or insufficient risk taking (type error II). 
Monitoring and compensation systems bring managerial risk taking in line with the interests of shareholders. Wright 
et al. (2007) showed that managerial option incentives are directly and uniformly related to subsequent firm risk 
taking. As argued by the authors (2007: 88), at substantial values of these incentives managerial decisions may 
become unduly influenced by a risk aversion predisposition, harming the interests of external shareholders. Future 
research may shed light on the moderating effects of agency theory variables on managerial decisions affecting 
strategic risk and return. Incorporation of an ordinal strategic risk measure into other areas of organizational research 
may prove fruitful.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 Step 1. Building the Aggregated Matrix of Events,  = [I,J,K,T] 
We build a matrix of events, i, for each of the 40 firms forming the system (the CAC 40, a French stock market 
index) from the ordinal coding of the annual profitability of their ROA over the 5-year periods 1988-92, 1993-97, 
and 1998-02. If all of the matrices, i, describing individual firms are summed over i, then a matrix,  = 
 
kj
i
kji ,,,, . 





 , which describes the incidence of state transitions for the entire system is created.  
 
 Step 2. Building the Joint Transition Matrix, P = [pj,k] 
We build the joint transition probabilities matrix for the system, P=[pj,k], whose elements are the joint frequencies: 
...
.
,,
,,
,


kj
kjp  . This is accomplished by dividing each element of the matrix of events, , by the total number of 
transitions. The total number of transitions is 160 (i.e., 40 firms  4 possible transitions for each firm) for each five-
year period. This matrix P describes the joint probabilities derived from the state transitions. For example, p2,1 is 
simply the probability that a firm selected at random will move from category two to category one in the next period 
(here, the following year). 
 
 Step 3. Building the Joint Entropy Matrix derived from the matrix P 
We use the transition probabilities to calculate the total uncertainty of the system. This is accomplished by reference 
to the information theoretic concepts provided by Shannon and Weaver (1949). The entropy of the system, H(J, K), 
where J is the initial row and K, the final row, is calculated from (Eq. 1): 
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 
  

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



n
j
n
k
kjkj
n
j
n
k
kjkjKJ ppwhereppH
1 1
,,
1 1
,,),( 1,0,)ln(  (Eq.1). 
As a result, we obtain the joint entropy matrix derived from the matrix P. The total joint entropy of this matrix of 
joint entropies is calculated by summing all of the individual cell entropies.  
 
 Step 4. Building the Conditional Entropy Matrix 
We transform the joint transition probabilities matrix into a conditional transition probabilities matrix, identical in 
form to a Markov matrix. Denoting the probability of moving to category k, given that the firm is now in category j 
by p(k,j), this is accomplished by dividing each entry in the joint probability matrix by the sum of the joint 
probabilities in its row. For any given category classification, k, the conditional probabilities associated with prior 
knowledge of starting category are: 



n
k
kjj
j
kj
jk ppwhere
p
p
p
1
,,
,
,
)/( .
.
 
 
  

n
j
n
j
n
k
jkjkjk npppand
1 1 1
)/()/()/( .,1,0  
We can then build the conditional entropy matrix, whose elements are the products: 
]ln[ )/()/( jkjk pp  .  
In any case the conditional entropy associated with starting category j=y is defined by (Eq.2): 


 
n
k
yjkyjkyjk pph
1
)/()/()/( ]ln[  (Eq. 2). 
The average conditional entropy of the system is simply the weighted sum of the entropies of each of the conditional 
distributions in each row. It is defined by (Eq. 3): 
]ln[
1
)/()/(
1 1
)/( jkjk
n
j
n
k
JK pp
n
H 
 
  (Eq. 3). 
 
 Step 5. Computing the total uncertainty of the system 
We calculate the weighted average conditional entropy, HW(K/J), a measure of the total uncertainty of the system, 
defined by (Eq.4): 
]ln[
1
)/()/(
1 1
,)/( jkjk
n
j
n
k
kjJK pp
n
wHW 
 
  (Eq. 4) 
Since the weighted average conditional entropy measure takes into account the qualitative aspect of the seriousness 
of category shift (via the weights wj,k), HW(K/J) provides a measure of the level of uncertainty associated with the 
system‟s member‟s behavior. The total uncertainty, as defined by (Eq. 4), links the probability of occurrence of three 
distinct performance events in the system: (i) degradation of the row of classification, (ii) improvement of the row of 
classification, and (iii) stability of the row of classification.  
 
 Step 6. Computing Ordinal Strategic Risk for an individual firm i 
Equation (Eq. 5) below gives the analytic formulation of ordinal strategic risk for a firm i, denoted )/( JKiRISK . It is 
defined as the difference between the ordinal strategic risk which is attributable to an individual firm i, 
denoted )/( JKiHWR , and an ordinal measure of system risk, i.e., the system riskiness of the reference set of firms as 
a whole (a sample of 40 firms), denoted )/( JKHWR . Ordinal strategic risk for an individual firm is measured 
relatively to a target level or benchmark. The term )/( JKHWR  in equation (Eq. 5) may serve as a proxy for this 
strategic risk benchmark, since it corresponds to the system riskiness or total risk of the reference set of firms.  
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)/()/()/( JKJKiJKi HWRHWRRISK   (Eq. 5) 
 
with: 
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and 
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 
  (Eq. 5.2) 
 
After simplification, equation (Eq. 5) may be written as follows: 
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 (Eq. 5.3) 
 
Ordinal strategic risk for each of the 40 firms included in the sample (or system) was computed using equation 
(Eq. 5.3), where: 
 kjw ,  is a weight function generated by making the assumption that seriousness of loss of position is 
directly proportional to the number of positions lost. 
 The )/( jkp  denote the conditional probabilities of any transition events from rank j to rank k in the system.  
 kji ,,  is the total number of transitions made by firm i from rank j to rank k. 
 ,.., j  is the sum of transitions that start in category j for all entities in the system. 
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